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Abstract
A unique characteristic of crowdsourcing contest is the coexistence of multiple
contests and each individual contestant strategically chooses the contest that
maximizes his/her expected gain. The competition between contests for contestants
significantly changes the optimal allocation of prizes for contest organizers. We show
that the contestants with higher ability prefer to single-prize contests while those with
lower ability prefer to multiple-prize contests, which makes single-prize contest is no
longer the optimal choice for organizers as it was in the context of a single contest.
We demonstrate that the organizers may allocate multiple prizes whether they intent
to maximize total efforts or highest efforts, and presents the condition under which the
multiple-prize approach will be optimal.
Introduction
With the growth of the internet and online communities, crowdsourcing has
increasingly become an important strategy for businesses to tap into the wisdom of
the public. Crowdsourcing refers to “the act of a company or institution taking a
function once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined (and
generally large) network of people in the form of an open call.” (Howe 2006). The
function can be R&D challenges, product design, advertisement planning, software
development and others. Crowdsourcers can be Fortune 500 companies, government
agencies, charity organizations, or small enterprises and individuals, while
crowdsourcees are typically small enterprises and individuals (Howe 2008).
Crowdsourcing is often conducted in a form of contest with prize varying from
hundreds to millions of dollars. In a crowdsourcing contest, a crowdsourcer
announces a task contest and the associated prize rule, then the public decide whether
to participate given the task requirement, his/her capability and prize rules. After the
crowdsourcees complete the tasks and submit their results, the crowdsourcer chooses
the winner(s) and award prize(s) based on the prize rule. One of the most well-known
crowdsourcing contests is organized by Netflix, a movie rental company. It offers a
prize of $1 million to the first contestant(s) who can improve its movie
recommendation system by at least 10 percent.
A central issue in the design of crowdsourcing contest is the allocation of prizes
among contestants. Offering prizes to multiple contestants can encourage participation
while offering a single prize to the best contestant can increase competition among the
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top contestants. A striking result of prior research on multi-person contest is that, if
the cost function of the contestants is linear or concave, it is always optimal to offer a
single prize than multi prizes (Moldovanu and Sela 2001).
However, online crowdsourcing has a unique characteristic: crowdsourcing contests
are usually posted on an online crowdsourcing platform that offers multiple
crowdsourcing tasks to choose from. For instance, Innocentive.com offers thousands
of crowdsourcing contests on R&D challenges, Topcoder.com lists thousands of
software development contests, and Taskcn.com receives and posts thousands of Logo
designing contests every day. Contestants can browse and compare those task contests
for free and then choose to participate in those that are most likely to bring them prize.
This characteristic suggests that there exists competition among multiple contests, an
issue not considered in prior studies that focus on off-line contests.
The research question of this paper is thus to identify how crowdsourcers should
allocate prizes under the presence of multiple competing contests. We find that the
allocation of prizes under this condition needs to consider not only the strategic
interactions between crowdsourcer and contestants, but also the competition between
crowdsourcers. We show that the classic result that, if the cost function of the
contestants is linear or concave, it is always optimal to offer a single prize than
multiple prizes (Moldovanu and Sela 2001) no longer holds.
Literature Review
Although crowdsourcing contest is still in the early stage, contest itself is not a new
idea. In economic studies, contest is defined as economic or social activities in
which two participants or more pay money or labor in order to get some prize
(Dasgupta and Nti, 1998). Such phenomena are commonly observed in real life, e.g.,
the promotion and hiring within an organization, new product R&D contest, athletic
competitions, and economic competition among nations.
In early studies of the allocation of prize in contests, researchers assume that the
contestants are homogeneous, i.e., the contestants don’t have significant differences in
ability and there is no private information in a contest (Clark and Riis, 1998; Barut
and Dan, 1998). However, it might not be the case in reality. Glazer and Hassin
(1988) took into account the heterogeneity of contestants and put forward an
incomplete information contest model, but they did not obtain an explicit result.
Afterwards, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) established a new incomplete information
contest model, in which, the contestants had different ability and the ability type was
regarded as private information. The cost of each contestant is decided by his ability
type and level of efforts. The purpose of the crowdsourcer is to maximize either the
total effort of all contestants or the highest effort among all contestants. They proved
that when the cost function is linear and concave, the total incentive of a single prize
is greater than that of multiple prizes. When the cost function is convex, the incentive
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of different prize allocation strategies is correlated with the distribution of contestants’
ability.
Besides the generalized model of Moldovanu and Sela (2001), recent IS studies have
focused on online crowdsourcing contests. J. Yang etc. (2008) studied the difference
of prize allocation between different types of tasks by using the data collected from
Taskcn.com. According to their statistics, there exist both single-prize and
multi-prizes contests in all types of tasks, but there is a difference in proportions of
the two depending on task type. For designing contests, the proportion for
multi-prizes was comparatively small; while strategy and web contests are usually
listed with prizes to multiple contestants. Y. Yang etc. (2009) showed that multi-prizes
appear superior to single-prize for all task types. In particular, multi-prizes are more
effective in expertise project such as software development than in ideation project
such as graph designing. Archak and Sundararajan (2009) gave special attention to the
asymptotic behavior of the contest outcome. They demonstrated that when the
contestants are risk neutral, single-prize is optimal even if the crowdsourcer needs
more than one solution; when the contestants are risk averse, multi-prizes may be
optimal and the number of prizes can be more than the desired number of solutions.
Different from the previous research, we study the problem of prize allocation in a
unique setting: contest competition. In crowdsourcing contest, competitions are not
just among contestants, but also among crowdsourcers as contestants make strategic
participation decisions. We show the optimal strategy for crowdsourcers when they
facing competition from others. The contest model developed in this paper is based on
Moldovanu and Sela (2006), with the standard assumptions of heterogeneity of
contestants, risk neutrality, and linear cost function.
The Model of Crowdsourcing Contest
Consider a contest where k prizes are awarded. The value of all the prizes is the same,
k

that is, V 1 = V 2 =…= V k . We assume  Vi  1 for normalization. There are n
i 1

contestants. We assume that k<n. In the contest, each player i makes an effort x i . An
effort causes a cost denoted by c i x i , where c i >0 is an ability parameter. A low c i
means that i has a high ability and vice versa. Abilities are independently drawn from
an interval [m,1] according to a distribution function F. We assume F has a
continuous density function f>0. Note that m is strictly positive. And c i is private
information to i. F and f are common knowledge. The contestants whose effort is
higher than or equal to the k highest effort win the prizes.
Assume that all contestants undertake effort according to the function b, and assume
that this function is strictly monotonic and differentiable. Contestant i’s maximization
problem is:
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max (1  F (b 1 ( x)))n 1  cx
x

Denote by C 1 , C 2 , …,C n the identical, independently distributed random variables
governing the distribution of the contestants’ abilities. Denote by C (1,n) , C (2,n) ,…,C (n,n)
the corresponding order statistics, and by F (1,n) , F (2,n) ,…,F (n,n) their respective
distribution functions.
According to Corollary 1 of Moldovanu and Sela (2006), each contestant’s
equilibrium-effort function is given by:
1 11
x  bn ,k (c )   dF( k ,n 1) (t )
k ct
Let Fkn (c) denote the probability that agent i with type c meets n-1 competitors such

that k-1 of them have lower types, and n-k have higher types. The expected utility of
each contestant is given by:
1
U n ,k (c, bn , k (c))  F1n (bn ,k 1 ( x))  cbn , k (c)
k
By the Envelope Theorem, it follows that
dU n ,k (c, bn , k (c))
dc



U n ,k (c, bn ,k (c))
c

 bn ,k

Together with the boundary condition bn , k (1)  0 , this yields
1

U n ,k (c)   bn ,k ( s)ds
c

If the crowdsourcer is going to maximize the expected value of total effort, we have
 1 
1
Rn ,k  n  bn ,k (c)dF (c)  E 

m
 C( k 1,n ) 
See the proof in Moldovanu and Sela (2006)’s Proposition 2.
If the crowdsourcer is going to maximize the expected value of highest effort, then we
have
1  1  1 (n 1)! (2n 1  k )!  1 
Rn,k  E 

E


k  C( k ,n1)  k (n 1  k )! (2n 1)!
 C( k ,2n1) 

See the proof in Appendix.
The Allocation of Prize
Consider two contests. Contest 1 has k 1 prizes, and contest 2 has k 2 prizes. The prize
sum of the contests is the same. The interesting question is: which contest will the
contestants choose to participate? This is answered by the following result.
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Proposition 1. Consider a contest with n contestants. For any number of prizes k 1 , k 2
such that k 1 <k 2 <n,

(1) if U n ,k1 (m)  U n , k2 ( m) , then Un,k1 (c)  Un,k2 (c) for all c [m,1) ;
(2) if Un,k1 (m)  Un,k2 (m) , there exists a unique c '  c '(n, k1 , k2 )  (m, c*) such that:
(a) U n , k1 (c)  U n , k2 (c ) ;
(b) Un,k1 (c)  Un,k2 (c) for all c[m, c') ;
(c) Un,k1 (c)  Un,k2 (c) for all c(c',1] .
See the proof in Appendix.
That is, if the contestant with the highest ability prefers the contest with a large
number of prizes, all the contestants will have the same preference. Otherwise, there
exists a certain ability level, which divides the contestants into two groups. The
contestants whose ability is higher than that level prefer the contest with the smaller
number of prizes; while the contestants with the ability lower than that level prefer the
contest with the larger number of prizes. Intuitively, it means that the contest with a
large number of prizes is more attractive to less-able contestants.
Now, we assume two crowdsourcers announce two contests at the same time.
Contestants regard both contests as an n-participant contest, and decide which one to
take. If two contests have the same number of prizes, n contestants divide evenly to
two

contests,

each

contest

has

n
n'   
2

contestants.

If

k 1 <k 2 <n

and

Un,k1 (m)  Un,k2 (m) , all the contestants choose contest 2. If k 1 <k 2 <n and
Un,k1 (m)  Un,k2 (m) , the number of the contestants who choose contest 1 is given by

n1   nF (c ')  the number of the contestants who choose contest 2 is given
by n2   n(1  F (c '))  . The ability distribution of contestants in contest 1 is given by
 F (c)
, c [m, c ']

G(c)   F (c ')
, while the ability distribution of contestants in contest 2 is
 1,
c  (c ',1]


c [m, c ')
 0,

. We can use the following matrix to describe
given by H(c)   F(c)  F(c ')
 1 F(c ') , c [c ',1]
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the firms’ payoff with different prize strategies:
Crowdsourcer 2

k  k1

k  k2

k  k1

RnF',k1 RnF',k1

RnG1 ,k1 RnH2 ,k2

k  k2

RnH2 ,k2 RnG1 ,k1

RnF',k2 RnF',k2

Crowdsourcer1

When RnF',k1  RnH2 ,k2 and RnG1,k1  RnF',k2 (Condition 1) is satisfied, k  k1 is optimal to both
firms. When RnF',k1  RnH2 ,k2 and RnG1 ,k1  RnF',k2 (Condition 2) is satisfied, k  k2 is optimal
to both firms. Otherwise, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Moldovanu and Sela (2006)’s Proposition 2 states when there is only one contest, the
optimal strategy of crowdsourcer is to allocate the entire budget to one prize.
However, according to our analysis above, in a multi-contests setting, the situation is
more complex. When Condition 1 is satisfied, the single-prize strategy is optimal;
when Condition 2 is satisfied, the multi-prizes strategy is optimal. If both conditions
are not satisfied, the optimal strategy is a mixed strategy.
The intuition of our analysis is that, while facing a single-prize and a multi-prizes
contest, contestants will self-select into two groups. Contestants with higher ability
participate in the single-prize contest, while contestants with lower ability participate
in the multi-prizes contest. Although the contestants in the single-prize contest have
higher ability than those in the multi-prizes contest, the number of the contestants in
the single-prize contest can be lower than those in the multi-prizes contest. Since a
crowdsourcer’s payoff is not only related to the ability level of contestants but also the
number of contestants, his payoff could be lower. Therefore, in the multi-contests
setting, multi-prizes could be an optimal strategy for crowdsourcers.
Conclusion
We have studied the prize allocation problem of crowdsourcing contest. We prove that
as long as there exist multiple contests for contestants to choose, single-prize strategy
can not always be optimal, ever under the standard assumptions of heterogeneity of
contestants, risk neutrality, and linear cost function. Moreover, we specify the
conditions under which single-prize or multi-prizes is optimal. Our research can be
regarded as a supplement to Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) and helps
crowdsourcers allocate contest prizes more effectively.
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Appendix
1. Proof of the Expected Value of Highest Effort

Rn , k 









1

m

1
k

bn , k ( c ) dF(1, n ) ( c ) 

1
dF( k , n 1) (t ) dF(1, n ) ( c )
t
1
1
  F(1, n ) ( c ) dF( k , n 1) ( c ))
m
c
1

1

m

c

 

11
1
( F(1, n ) ( c )  dF( k , n 1) (t ) 1m
c t
k
1 11
F(1, n ) ( c ) dF( k , n 1) ( c )
k m c
1 11
[1  (1  F ( c )) n ]dF( k , n 1) ( c )
k m c
1 11
1 11
dF( k , n 1) ( c )   (1  F ( c )) n dF( k , n 1) ( c )

k mc
k mc
1 11
1 ( n  1)! (2 n  1  k )! 1 1
dF( k , n 1) ( c ) 
dF( k ,2 n 1) ( c )

k mc
k ( n  1  k )! (2 n  1)! m c


1  1  1 ( n  1)! (2 n  1  k )!  1
E
E


k  C ( k , n 1)  k ( n  1  k )! (2 n  1)!
 C ( k ,2 n 1) 

2. Proof of Proposition 1
1 11
d F( k , n 1) (t ) dc
m k c t

1

U n , k ( m )   bn , k (c ) dc  
m

1

1

1 11
1 1 1
 c   d F( k , n 1) (t )   c  dF( k , n 1) (c )
c
k t
k m c
m
m 11
1 1

dF
t
d F( k , n 1) (c )
(
)
k
n

(
,
1)
k m t
k m
 1 
1
 (1  mE 
)
k
 C( k , n 1) 




 



For E 1  E 1   k2 k1  1 E 1  we obtain Un,k1 (m) Un,k2 (m) , otherwise,
C(k ,n1)  C(k ,n1)  k1  m C(k ,n1) 


1





2







1



Un,k1 (m) Un,k2 (m) .
1

By Moldovanu & Sela (2006)’s Lemma 2, we obtain Un,k (c) Un,k (c)   (bn,k bn,k )dt 0
c
2

1

2

1

for all c  (c*, 1)
If Un,k1 (m)  Un,k2 (m) , for all c  (m, c*) , we have
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1

U n,k2 (c)  U n,k1 (c)   (bn,k2  bn,k1 )dt
c

c*

1

c

c*

c*

1

m

c*

  (bn,k1  bn,k2 )dt   (bn,k2  bn,k1 )dt
  (bn,k1  bn,k2 )dt   (bn,k2  bn,k1 )dt  0
Therefore, for Un,k1 (m)  Un,k2 (m) , we obtain Un,k1 (c) Un,k2 (c) for all c [m,1) .
If Un,k1 (m) Un,k2 (m) , that is
Lemma 2, we know that
is

single-crossing,

1

b
c

n , k1

1

b

there

1



m

1

bn,k1 dt  bn,k2 dt . By Moldovanu and Sela (2006)’s
m

1

c n,k1

dt  bn,k2 dt for all c  (c*,1) . Since bnk, 1 (c) and bn,k2 (c)

must

c

exist

a

unique

c '  ( m, c*) ,

such

that

1

dt   bn ,k2 dt for c  c ' , Un,k1 (c)  Un,k2 (c) for c  (c ',1) and Un,k1 (c)  Un,k2 (c)
c

for c  [ m, c ') .
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